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Abstract. In this paper we provide a formal analysis of the idea of normative co-ordination.
We argue that this idea is based on the assumption that agents can achieve flexible co-ordination
by conferring normative positions to other agents. These positions include duties, permissions,
and powers. In particular, we explain the idea of declarative power, which consists in the
capacity of the power-holder of creating normative positions, involving other agents, simply by
“proclaiming” such positions. In addition, we account also for the concepts of representation,
namely the representative’s capacity of acting in the name of his principal, and of mandate,
which is the mandatee’s duty to act as the mandator has requested. Finally, we show how the
framework can be applied to represent the contract-net protocol. Some brief remarks on future
research and applications conclude this contribution.
Keywords:Multi-Agent Systems, Normative Co-ordination, Institutionalized Power
1. Motivation and Scope of This Article
A paradigm shift is happening in Artificial Intelligence as well as in main-
stream computer science with the advent of agents and agent-oriented ap-
proaches to developing systems, both on a theoretical and practical level.
As pointed out in (Broersen et. al., 2001), at least three general models for
autonomous agents are developed in the literature. A first approach includes
a number of systems that roughly focus on goal-based planning or on qual-
itative decision theory (see Boutilier, 1994). A second line of research is
mainly aimed to provide a cognitive account of agents by specifying their
mental states and motivational attitudes, such as the BDI model (see Rao and
Georgeff, 1991). The third option is specifically oriented to model societies of
agents by means of normative concepts such as obligation, permission, power
and so on (see Conte and Dellarocas, 2001; Pitt, 2004; Nute and Lomuscio,
2004).
In this paper we will focus on the third of the above mentioned approaches
to multi-agent systems. This research assumes that as in human societies, also
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in artificial societies normative concepts may play a decisive role, allowing
for the flexible co-ordination of intelligent autonomous agents. It has been
argued, in addition, that the adoption of a normative perspective would al-
low a substantial progress in the creation of agent societies, a progress that
would be even more important for societies where humans and agents interact
(see Pitt, 2004).
Of course, there is a number of ways according to which the issue of
the role of normative concepts in MAS can be approached. Among them,
a formal-theoretical investigation seems to be of great interest. In particular,
a logic-oriented approach is useful insofar as it allows to make more rig-
orous normative notions as those analyzed by philosophers and sociologists
and potentially relevant for modelling MAS. In this perspective, a precise
logical analysis of normative notions such as obligations, institutions, respon-
sibilities, delegation, powers, etc, is one precondition for the development
of norm-governed societies. As recently pointed out regarding the design
of computerized multi-agent systems, this logical analysis “[is] a means of
supplying an intermediate level of description, falling somewhere between
[. . . ] ordinary-language account of what a system [. . . ] is supposed to be able
to do and [. . . ] the level of implementation” (Jones, 2004). In fact, describing
and modelling norm-governed organizations and societies of agents means
manipulating and making inferences over the normative concepts that are
required to account for such organizations. In its turn, this presupposes to
have an accurate and suitable formal representation of those concepts.
In the spirit of this extensive line of research, the current paper will not
address explicitly the problem of practical implementations of multi-agent
systems. Rather, it will be supplying some hints on how to articulate the just
mentioned intermediate level of description. In particular, our aim is to pro-
vide a formal analysis of some conceptual preconditions that, we believe, any
normative-based approach to the idea of co-ordination of agents should take
into account. The idea of normative co-ordination is based on the assump-
tion that (human and artificial) agents can achieve flexible co-ordination by
conferring normative positions to other agents. Those positions can include
not only duties and permissions, but also powers, as for instance powers of
creating further normative positions on the head of other agents. In particular
we will characterize three ideas. First, the idea of declarative power, which
consists in the capacity of the power-holder of creating normative positions,
involving other agents, simply by “proclaiming” such positions. Secondly,
the idea of representation, which is the representative’s capacity of acting in
the name of his principal. Thirdly, the idea of mandate, which corresponds
to the mandatee’s duty to act as the mandator has requested. These notions
do not exhaust the idea of normative co-ordination. However, we believe that
they belong to the basic building blocks for such an approach to be specified.
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They may indeed be useful both for determining the relations and interactions
between a user and its agents, or between autonomous agents.
We shall proceed as follows. In section 2 we will informally discuss these
notions. After presenting the logical framework used in this paper (section
3), in sections 4 and 5 we will provide a formal analysis of declarative power,
representation and mandate. In section 6 such a framework will be used to
account for the scenario of the contract-net protocol. Section 7 reports future
developments of our work. In Section 8 we sum the related work. Finally, in
Section 9 we make our concluding remarks.
2. The Legal Framework: Declarative Power, Representation and
Mandate
The notions we want to investigate originate from a legal background. Power,
representation and mandate are indeed notions we can find in every legal
system, though they may be differently regulated. We will focus on their
general aspects, which are common to most legal systems.
2.1. DECLARATIVE POWER AND CONTRACTUAL LIBERTY
The idea of declarative power provides a general facility though which au-
tonomous agents can shape their own normative environment. If agents are
to be really autonomous (in the sense in which one legally speaks of “private
autonomy”) they must go beyond the possibility of activating institutional
connections between pre-determined actions and pre-determined results: they
must be empowered to state what normative relations they want to hold be-
tween them, and to achieve those effects by doing so. This is performed by
what is usually called a declaration of will or intention: the interested agents
state the results they want to achieve, in the appropriate form, and the insti-
tution within which they are operating makes so that exactly those results are
achieved (usually assuming that certain conditions are satisfied).
Such an empowerment of autonomous agents also corresponds to the needs
of a complex self-organizing society, where it is not possible to establish in
advance all normative relations between agents. In such a society it must be
left to agents themselves to decide what normative relations are appropriate
to their needs, or required for the fulfillment of their tasks. In the law, this
normative self-organization typically happens through contracts (a contract is
a declarative act jointly performed also by all parties whose status is going to
be changed by the declaration they are performing). For example, the Italian
Civil Code art. 1321 establishes that “the contract is the agreement between
two or more parties to create, regulate, or extinguish any legal relationship
between them”. This means that, through a contract, the parties can create
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new legal positions (duties, powers or rights), they can extinguish them, and
they can transfer them (for example, property rights) from one party to an-
other. Note that the law does not establish what changes a contract will make
to the legal positions of the parties: it is up to the latter to establish those
changes, and the law will in principle recognize their will, i.e., it will produce
exactly those results which the parties state in the contractual terms (the law
can integrate and modify some of those results though). This also explains
why single contracts usually cannot be exhaustively classified as of the types
of acts which theories of institutional acts usually distinguish (commissive,
commands, etc.): a single contract usually, at once, establishes new duties (for
example, the obligation to pay the price), creates new rights (for example, the
right to receive the price, or to be delivered the goods), transfers existing
rights (for example, the property of the goods), and so forth.
In fact contracts put into focus a new dimension of autonomy: private
autonomy, or contractual autonomy, by which one means the possibility of
realizing the legal effects the parties wish, just by stating those effects. In
this regard, we must consider that contracts are similar to legislation (as, for
example, observed in Kelsen, 1967): the legal effects of an act of Parliament
are those effects which are stated in that act: to determine what rules and
legal positions have been brought into existence by an act of Parliament, one
should not look at a pre-existing convention, since the effects of the act are
not established by conventions, but by the act itself. One should rather look
at the content of the act, i.e., one should look at what the Parliament declared
(there may be interpretative conventions, but these connect the words used in
the act to certain meanings, not directly to certain institutional results).
2.2. REPRESENTATION AND MANDATE
An agent that has the power of making the type of statements we described
above, may however not be in condition of directly exercising this power (he
may lack the time, the opportunity, etc.). However also in this regard, there is
no need to impose a regulation from above: an autonomous agent must rather
be able to delegate to other agents the exercise of his own powers. So au-
tonomy is further enhanced by instrument of representation, which basically
concerns the situation “where a principal is held to declarations, especially
contracts, made on his behalf” (Zweigert and Ko¨tz, 1992). As it is argued, the
essential aspect of representation is the grant of an authority or of a power:
the representative’s declarations can directly bind the principal, since they
count as if they were the principal’s declarations (contrary to the fact that one
person’s declaration normally can only bind that person).
In most cases, one subject confers representation to another, by accom-
panying it with a mandate, that is with the obligation of exercising (and
of exercising in a certain way) the power of representation. So, in general
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terms, the idea of mandate concerns instead the situation where one agent (the
mandator) has commanded another agent (the mandatee) to do something on
his account. Usually a mandate presupposes that the mandator has authority
over the mandatee (for example, being his employer), or that a contract has
been signed between them for the execution of a specific business. Therefore,
the mandator’s requests generate the mandatee’s duty to act in such a way
as the mandator has requested, in order to satisfy the interests (or to achieve
the goals) of the mandator. It is interesting to remark that while in common
law the ideas of representation and mandate tend to conflate into the idea of
agency (intended in general as the situation when one is acting in the interest
of another), in the civil law tradition the distinction has become a common-
place since the XIX century (Zweigert and Ko¨tz, 1992, pp. 461ff.), when
German legal doctrine introduced it. The distinction, however, is also clear
within the common law, though not being reflected in a precise terminology.
So, (Salmond and Williams, 1945) say: “We are here concerned with agency
not in its aspect as a relationship or contract between principal and agent
imposing and conferring rights and obligations between the parties, but in its
aspect as a grant by the principal to his agent of authority to represent him in
the exercise of his power of making contracts with third persons”.
2.3. CONNECTIONS AMONG DECLARATIVE POWER, REPRESENTATION
AND MANDATE
Before moving into the formal analysis, let us spend a few words on the
connection between the three concepts we have sketched so far.
The notion of declarative power is the basic one. Representation is usually
created by an exercise of such a power, and so is a mandate. Additionally, it is
not uncommon that representation and mandate go together with each other:
whenever a principal confers an agent the power to represent her, usually
the principal also binds the agent so that he acts in certain specific ways, or
there is a legal relation which provides the background for the exercise of the
representation. Consider, for example, the case when the employee in a shop
represents his employer, and makes in his name contracts with the clients. In
such a case, the authority of the representative is linked to his duties as an
employee, and he is bound to exercise his authority according to such duties.
However, it is possible that there is representation without mandate (that the
agent has the power to act in the name of the principal, without the obligation
to do so). As the American Restatement of the law of torts affirms: “It is not
essential to the existence of authority, that there be a contract between the
principal and the agent and that the agent promise or otherwise undertake to
act as an agent”. Consider for example the situation when one person confers
to a relative the power of representing her in the sale of her house. The relative
may not be obliged towards his principal to exercise this power (assume that
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he tells her: “If I have time enough I will go to the notary and sell the house
in your name, but I undertake no obligation to doing that”). He may just be
permitted to do that (she relies on his goodwill for accomplishing this task).
What usually accompanies representation, besides the power of the repre-
sentative, is his duty to exercise this power (if he decides to do so) in such
a way as to satisfy the interest of his principal (see for example, art. 1388 of
the Italian Civil Code, which explicitly requires that the representative acts
“nell’interesse”, that is in the interest, of the principal). However, representa-
tion still exists when the representative violates this duty, acting against the
interest of the principal. Though there is an “abuse of representation”, the
contract concluded by the representative still binds the principal (the contract
is only voidable if the counterparty knew, or should have known, that the
representative was acting against the duty assigned by the principal). How-
ever, the representative may be obliged to compensate the principal for the
losses incurred because of his abuse. The situation where the representative
acts against any duties he may have towards the principal, but does an act
which is within his power, must be distinguished from the situation where the
representative lacks the power of representation or acts beyond such power.
In this case the contract will generally not be effective at all in regard to the
person in the name of which the representative affirmed he was acting.
In our discussion of representation, we should finally consider one aspect
where common law and civil law systems diverge. In civil law systems, the
representative only binds the principal towards the third party, when he acts
“in the name” of the principal, that is when he makes known to the third party
that he is representing the principal (for example, the Italian code explicitly
says that, in representation, the representative acts in the name of the prin-
cipal). Only in this case the civil law sees a real instance of representation,
which implies that the principal acquires the legal positions arising from the
act of the middleman, so that the third party can directly sue the principal.
If the middleman transacts in his own name, he alone acquires rights and
duties under the contract even if, just as in the case of “true” representations,
he was acting on the principal’s business and account without having any
personal interest in the transactions at all. According to the common law,
on the contrary, representation exists also when the agent does not disclose
the name of the principal, though he is acting under the instruction of the
principal. The third party can also in this case directly sue the principal, once
he has discovered her identity. However, even civil law systems consider the
hypothesis when one contract is concluded for whom it may concern, that
is when the middleman makes known that he is representing somebody, but
does not mention the specific person on whose behalf he is acting. In such a
case, according to the Italian law, when the middleman indicates the name of
the person who is going to take over the contract, and this person accepts, then
the contract directly binds this person, as if the middleman was representing
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this person from the start. If the person is not named or refuses to take over
the contract, then the contract binds the middleman.
One important aspect of representation, which makes it interesting when
used for intelligent agents, is that the representative does not limit his con-
tribution to the transmission of a declaration which was prepared by the
principal in advance. Usually, on the contrary, the principal elects a repre-
sentative, exactly because she does not know how she should best handle the
business she has entrusted to the representative, in the circumstance where
this business will take place (since she does not know what this circumstance
will be). When the representative decides to perform a transaction in the
name of his principal, this is the representative’s own decision, so that his
contractual declaration expresses his own intention, as determined by his
goals and beliefs. In other words, beyond those specific conditions that were
predetermined by the principal, the transaction is willed and decided upon by
the representative. This is relevant, in particular, for the so-called defects of
the will, i.e., those mental states of the parties that may impair the validity
of a contract, determining its voidableness (as in cases of mistake, duress,
misrepresentation or deception). To establish whether one such state holds,
one has to consider the mind of the representative, rather than the mind of the
principal (the states of mind of the principal are only relevant in relation to
those aspects of the contract which were predetermined by the principal).
So, for example, for deciding whether the contract is voidable because it
was based upon a mistake, one must consider whether the representative was
mistaken (Sartor, 2003).
Moreover, it is interesting to remark that usually, the legal capacity for
the act to be performed by the representative is required in the principal and
not in the representative: one person may ask her underage child to perform
some business for her (e.g., buy a bottle of milk), and the act performed by
the child in her name will be valid, though the child could not perform that
act for himself.
3. The Logical Framework
Our approach falls within the Kanger-Lindahl-Po¨rn (Kanger, 1972; Po¨rn,
1977; Lindahl, 1977) theory of organized interaction. A full account of our
logical framework can be found also in (Gelati et al., 2002a).
Here, it suffices to use the well-known action operator E j, employed in
expressions like “E jA” to mean that “agent j brings it about that A”. In addi-
tion to this classical reading, we extend the formalism to cover also collective
actions1. As suggested in (Lindahl, 1977), for the purpose of this paper it
is sufficient to index E by sets of agents (Carmo and Pacheco, 2001). So,
E{i, j,k}A means that i, j,k collectively bring it about that A. Investigating the
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nature of collective agency is outside the scope of this paper. Thus we refer
to the basic properties of E as described in (Santos and Carmo, 1996; Santos,
Jones and Carmo, 1997). In fact, different axiomatizations have been pro-
vided for E but almost all include EiA→ A (T, i.e., successfulness), ¬Ei>
(No), (EiA∧EiB)→ Ei(A∧B) (C), and are closed under logical equivalence.
If these are some general properties for E, a specific axiom advanced in
(Santos, Jones and Carmo, 1997) to characterize specifically this operator is
EiE jA→¬EiA (EE¬E). It corresponds to the idea that the brings-it-about op-
erator expresses actions performed directly and personally. These properties
are simply extended here to the case of sets of agents. For example, the axiom
stating that E is a successful operator is reformulated as EXA→ A, for any set
of agents X2. Moreover, when the content A of the operator E{i} is a specific
action (represented as an action predicate) we also use it to express that agent
i executes by itself action A. So, for example, we may use the expression
E{i}sell(o) to mean that agent j sells the object o.
Secondly, we will also make provision for directed deontic operators for
obligation and permission. For the sake of uniformity, we may index the de-
ontic operators O and P as well by set of agents. However, for the purposes
of our analysis, this is not necessary, thus avoiding to enter into a critical
discussion such as that about collective obligations (for an overview, see,
for instance, (Royakkers, 1998; Royakkers and Dignum, 1998; Krogh and
Herrestad, 1996)). Accordingly, we simply write O jE{k}A to mean that agent
k has, towards agent j, the obligation of realizing A. One might also say that
agent k has the obligation of realizing A in the interest of agent j. Similarly,
we write PjE{k}A to mean that agent k has, toward j, the permission of re-
alizing A (on the concept of directed obligation, see (Herrestad and Krogh,
1995; Krogh and Herrestad, 1996), though a different formalization is pro-
vided). Let us thus sketch a suitable logic for directed obligations. It may
be argued that Standard Deontic Logic (SDL) is not adequate for combining
deontic and action operators. For example, in SDL O jEiA implies that O jA,
which we feel unacceptable: the fact that i is obliged towards j to bring it
about that A should not entail that A is in general obligatory. For similar
reasons,OkEiE jA→OkE jA is a theorem of SDL. However, also this principle
cannot be accepted because the personal obligation on i should not imply a
personal obligation on j (Royakkers, 1998). For obvious reasons, we will not
enter here into a discussion about which axiomatization is suitable for mod-
elling deontic concepts. To avoid the just mentioned problems, it suffices to
assume that the logic for deontic concepts is closed under logical equivalence
and contains only the following axioms
(O jA∧O jB)→ O j(A∧B) (1)
O jA→¬O j¬A (2)
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We also accept the interdefinability between obligation and permission:
O jA=d f ¬Pj¬A (3)
Thirdly, we need a way of expressing connections holding in the context of
an institution. A typical example of this connection is the “counts as” relation,
according to which we may say that a certain piece of paper with certain
characteristics counts as a five euros bill. As argued in (Gelati et al., 2002a),
we basically follow the seminal idea developed by Jones and Sergot in (Jones
and Sergot, 1996), where it is introduced a specific conditional connective
‘⇒s’ to express the ‘counts as’ connection in an institution s. Jones and
Sergot’s logic for⇒s is of type CE and contains the schemata CC, CS and S
(transitivity) (see (Chellas, 1980)). Their analysis is integrated by introducing
the normalKDmodality Ds such that DsAmeans that A is “recognized by the
institution s” (Santos, Jones and Carmo, 1997). Accordingly, the schemata
(A⇒s B)→ Ds(A→ B) and (A⇒s B)→ (A→ DsA) are accepted, which
permit to obtain DsB from A⇒s B and A.
Jones and Sergot’s approach is of great interest but does not suit well with
our specific purposes. Our general intuition is that the “counts as” connection
basically corresponds to a general type of normative conditionality, but in
which institutional facts (Searle, 1995; MacCormick and Weinberger, 1986)
occur in the rules. We argue that any institution can only state what norma-
tive situation holds for itself, given certain conditions, and according to this
general type of conditionality. In this regard, we thus adopt a different for-
malization. We represent the “counts as” link as follows (for further details,
see also (Gelati et al., 2002a; Artosi, Rotolo and Vida, 2004)):
(AVs B) =de f (A⇒ DsB)∧ (DsA⇒ DsB) (4)
where
− ‘⇒’ corresponds to a general normative (non-monotonic) connection
with a restricted form of detachment;
− Ds strictly denotes the domain of institutional facts of a given institution
and so it is a non-normal modality.
More precisely, our logic for⇒ corresponds at least to cumulative reasoning
(Artosi, Governatori and Rotolo, 2002): it is closed under the rules RCEA
and RCK (Chellas, 1980), contains the schemata A⇒ A, (A⇒ B)∧ (A∧B⇒
C)→ (A⇒ C), (A⇒ B)∧ (A⇒ C)→ (A∧ B)⇒ C), and, in addition, is
characterized by a restricted form of detachment that allows to infer the
consequent X of a “counts as” rule only when no other rule in the system
(which is assumed to be finite) is applicable and permits to obtain ¬X (Gelati
et al., 2002a). The logic for the “counts as” link, thus, enjoys a restricted form
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of Reflexivity, which seems to characterize any non-monotonic classificatory
relation (Kraus, Lehmann and Magidor, 1990). In addition, it does not have
full transitivity, which does not hold in general: from “x’s digital signature
counts as x’s autograph signature” and “x’s autograph signature counts as
evidence of x’s handwriting” we cannot obtain “x’s digital signature counts
as evidence of x’s handwriting” (see also Artosi, Rotolo and Vida, 2004).
In its turn, the logic for the modality Ds is not in general closed under
the logical consequence. In our perspective, it should be closed under logical
equivalence and contain DsA→ ¬Ds¬A and (DsA∧DsB)→ Ds(A∧B). If
Ds is intended to express the domain of institutional facts relative to s, this
choice is justified because we want to drop some counterintuitive conclu-
sions that can be drawn by weakening the content in the scope of such a
modality. In other words, inferences like the following should be avoided:
(raising one hand) Vs (bidding) ` Ds((raising one hand) → ((bidding)∨
(drinking water))) (see Gelati et al., 2002a; Artosi, Rotolo and Vida, 2004).
However, some restricted form of closure is permitted. In particular, it is
reasonable to accept a schema like
DsEXA→ DsA (5)
to preserve successfulness of actions performed within institutions. Notice
that our combination of the logics for⇒ and Ds captures the defeasible char-
acter of the “counts as” link, while in Jones and Sergot’s original approach it
is possible to have A⇒s B ` Ds(A∧C→ B).
Let us also recall the main idea behind the idea of “counts as” as defined in
4. In fact, this notion occurs in the law mainly in two contexts: when the law
specifies that a certain brute fact (destroying the receipt) counts as a certain
type of legal act (freeing the debtor from his obligation) and when the law
wants to specify that a certain legal act (a contract made by person j in the
name of person k) has the same legal effects of another legal act (a contract
made by k). These two aspects of a counts-as connection are described in
(Gelati et al., 2002a)). Let us also remark, that though the AV B connection
and the modality D are usually relative to a certain institution (Jones and
Sergot, 1996), we do not need to specify this since we are considering just
one institution (the legal system).
The last notion we need is the idea of proclaiming. It is used to deal
with all those acts by which a subject makes a statement expressing a certain
proposition, and this statement has the function (purpose, point or objective)
of making this proposition true. Such a notion is formalized by the modal
operator proc (Gelati et al., 2002a). In short, proc is a non-normal modal
operator whose logic is closed under the logical equivalence. In addition to
what is said in (Gelati et al., 2002a), proc, as for E, will be indexed by sets
of agents. In this way, procXA means that the members of X jointly proclaim
A3. In this perspective, it is plausible to assume that, when a set of agents
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X makes a joint proclamation that A, then each agent j ∈ X makes such a
proclamation4: for all j ∈ X
procXA→ proc{ j}A (6)
The converse is not generally valid, since it may be argued that a joint decla-
ration is more than a couple of parallel declarations having the same content.
Also, as in (Gelati et al., 2002a), proc is characterized by the following axiom:
(procXA∧procXB)≡ procX(A∧B) (7)
In fact, it may seem that by proclaiming a conjunction a group also proclaims
each conjunct and that by proclaiming two propositions it proclaims their
conjunction.
As we argued in (Gelati et al., 2002a), proc is neutral in regard to intention-
based (Grice, 1989) and non intention-based theories of speech acts (Jones,
1990). By saying that j’s statement has the function to achieve A we do
not specify how the notion of function is to be characterized: it may be
determined by the intention of the speaker, by the intention attributed to
the speaker by its interlocutor, by a shared convention, by a communication
protocol, and so forth. However, given an expression like proc{ j}A, if one
wants to identify the mental precondition of a sincere use of proc{ j}A, one
may consider that (a) j must believe that A is not the case before performing
the proclamation, and (b) j must believe that through the proclamation one
will produce A.
Let us also remark that a proclamation is not necessarily effective (it does
not necessarily produce A). When the notion of function is interpreted with
reference to the intention of the speaker it necessarily involves an attempt to
achieve A, but this attempt may not be successful. Whether it is successful
or not, within a certain institutional context, depends on whether that institu-
tion makes it effective. For example, in legal systems children cannot validly
undertake obligations. If j is a child and she proclaims that she assumes an
obligation (e.g., the obligation to pay a certain price for a good), no oblig-
ation for j will be created according to the law. In designing a society of
autonomous agents a very important task is allocating declarative powers to
agents, that is in establishing what proclamations of theirs will be effective.
Finally, note that the idea of proclaiming is neutral in regard to what is
proclaimed. So a proclamation can play the function usually vested by differ-
ent speech acts. In particular, the combination of proc with directed deontic
operators allows to account, e.g., for the following cases:
proc{ j}(OkE{ j}A) (8)
where the proclamation is j’s attempt to commit itself towards k; on the other
hand, a proclamation is j’s attempt to command k, when it has the form:
proc{ j}(O jE{k}A) (9)
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with k different from j. It is j’s attempt to free itself from an obligation
towards k, when it has the form:
proc{ j}(¬OkE{ j}A) (10)
4. Declarative Power
4.1. BASIC NOTIONS
As we have observed, proclamations are not necessarily effective. When an
agent j proclaims that A, j brings it about that A only if the concerned institu-
tion provides for this result. This means that within the concerned institution
a rule must hold having the following content:
proc{ j}AV E{ j}A (11)
In other words, for the institution, j’s proclamation that A counts as j’s action
producing A. Note that according to the action logic presented in (Gelati et al.,
2002a), E{ j}A implies A. Therefore when proc{ j}(A) is effective, A follows
within the given institution in virtue of (5). Rules stating that a proclamation
is effective can be seen as a particular type of power-conferring rules. By a
power-conferring rule, we mean any rule stating that doing an action A counts
as (in the concerned institution) the performance of an action B (Jones and
Sergot, 1996), that is any rule having the form E{ j}AV E{ j}B.
Not every power is exercised through a proclamation. It may also be the
case in which an institution links a specific outcome to a specific action: con-
sider for example the connection between raising one’s hand in an auction and
making an offer. The peculiarity of the proc operator consists in its generality:
it may produce any state of affairs which is the object of the proclamation.
When an institution provides for the effectiveness of a proclamation that
A, we say that the subject of the proclamation has a declarative power:
DeclPow{ j}A=de f proc{ j}AV E{ j}A (12)
Therefore, that an agent j has the declarative power of producing A means
that if j proclaims that A then j produces A.
4.2. EMPOWERING AUTONOMOUS AGENTS
A fundamental aspect of a norm-governed society consists in the allotment
of permissions and obligations to its members. This is the way in which such
a society restrains and organizes the actions of its members. However, in an
autonomous society (autonomous means establishing laws for one-self) the
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agents themselves must be able of creating those permissions and obligations.
The decisive aspect of an autonomous social organization consists therefore
in the empowerment of its agents, that is in establishing how agents may
create what normative relations. In our model agents are empowered by at-
tributing them appropriate declarative powers. This should enable agents to
create the normative relations they need, and in this way to co-ordinate their
behaviors. The failure to provide a viable allocation of such powers may
threaten the survival of society. For example, if each self interested agents
were given an unlimited power to unilaterally create obligation on the head
of other agents, society would soon collapse, since everybody would soon
be covered with an unsustainable workload, obligations would no longer be
fulfilled, conflicts would explode, and trust would fade away. In the following
we will sketch some features of a viable allocation of powers, which gives
each agent the maximum of power consistent with the attribution of the same
power to other agents.
4.2.1. Multi-lateral Proclaims (Contracts)
A declarative power may be jointly exercised by more than one party. If so,
the proclamation will be an action performed by a set of agents. In very gen-
eral terms, we may call such an action a contract. For example the making of
a contract through which j takes the obligation towards k to provide a piece
of music m and k undertakes the obligation toward j to pay the price p, can
be represented by the following proclamation5:
proc{ j,k}(OkE{ j}(deliver(m))∧O jE{k}(pay(p))) (13)
Such joint proclaims are usually performed by two acts, the first of which
is called offer, and the second acceptance. This combination is considered
as a joint declaration (even when there is a delay between offer and ac-
ceptance). So we may want to say that the combination of an offer and an
acceptance counts as making a contract. In cases where contracts are limited
to the creation of reciprocal obligations we can express this as follows:
offer{ j},{k}(A,B)∧accept{ j},{k}(A,B)V proc{ j,k}(OkE{ j}A∧O jE{k}B)
(14)
If j offers to k to make a contract with reciprocal obligations having content
A and B, and k accepts, this counts as making the contract. If the parties have
the power to make an effective contract, the joint declaration generates within
the institution the obligations for the parties involved in the contract.:
D(OkE{ j}A∧O jE{k}B) (15)
where D is the “institutional” modality introduced in (4). The operators offer
and accept are two committing declarative acts, that can be defined using the
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non committing declarative acts proposal and agree.
proposal{ j},{k}(A,B) = proc{ j}(OkE{ j}A∧O jE{k}B) (16)
proposal{ j},{k} is a declaration of j where she proposes to ascribe to herself
the obligation towards k to do A, and to k the obligation towards herself to
do B. On the other hand, agreeing means to make a proclamation when the
other party has already made a proclamation in which it is proposed a specific
contractual content:
agree{k},{ j}(A,B) = proposal{ j},{k}(A,B)∧proc{k}(O jE{k}B) (17)
(17) means that k recognizes j’s proposal and agrees with its content. More
precisely, given j’s proposal, k agrees with binding herself to the obligation
towards j to do B.
We are now able to introduce offer and accept formally. We have an offer
when
offer{ j},{k}(A,B) = proposal{ j},{k}(A,B)∧
(agree{k},{ j}(A,B)V proc{ j,k}(OkE{ j}A∧O jE{k}B))
(18)
i.e., j proposes the content of the contract to k and she is aware that the
acceptance of it by k will create the respective obligations. Accordingly, k’s
acceptance is formalized as follows:
accept{k},{ j}(A,B) = offer{ j},{k}(A,B)∧proc{k}(O jE{k}B) (19)
In other words, accept indicates that k accepts the legally binding offer of j.
Since k’s proclamation is done in presence of j’s proposal (see (18)), such a
proclamation determines k’s agreement with the content (A,B). In addition,
the second conjunct of (18) ensures that the offer and the acceptance are
binding within the concerned institution.
4.2.2. Empowerment to Commit Oneself
We may consider giving every agent the power of creating obligations for
itself, i.e., the power of making effective promises, or of committing itself.
If our agents are autonomous, this power should be equally given to each of
them. However, this may seem too liberal: j’s obligation, towards k to perform
A implies the permission toward k to perform that action. So, k’s consent
seems to be required. We can propose a general rule attributing all agents the
power of committing themselves to other agents through a contract:
∀ j,k (DeclPow{ j,k}(OkE{ j}A)) (20)
which means that every couple of agents has the power of establishing any
obligation between them, simply by proclaiming it. In other words, we em-
power all our agents to make effective promises (with the consent of the
promisee).
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4.2.3. Empowerment to Remit Obligations and Give Permissions
It is reasonable to assign every agent j the power of freeing any other agent
k from obligations toward j, even without k’s consent. For example, if j is
no longer interested in k’s performance, j should be allowed to free k from
that performance. In fact, if j is able to look after itself and an obligation on
k was originally created to promote j’s interest, then j should be empowered
to choose whether to cancel that obligation or not:
∀ j,k (DeclPow{ j}(¬O jE{k}A)∧DeclPow{ j}(¬O j¬E{k}A)) (21)
Accordingly, this formula also enables an agent to give any permission to-
wards itself:
∀ j,k (DeclPow{ j}(PjE{k}A)) (22)
So, for example, if agent j has the obligation towards k not to access a certain
piece of information, k has the power of permitting that j accesses the infor-
mation, according to 22. This is a very libertarian approach, but is appropriate
for autonomous agents, e.g, in the commercial domain.
4.2.4. Empowerment to Command
It would be unreasonable to give all agents the power of commanding what-
ever action to any other agent. The power of commanding needs to be re-
stricted only to specific cases, such as when one agent is hierarchically su-
perior to another. A power of commanding held by superiors over inferiors
would be conferred by the following rule6:
∀ j,k ( j ≺ k⇒ DeclPow{ j}(O jE{k}A)) (23)
where ≺ corresponds to a hierarchical relation between agents. Notice that
‘⇒’ stands for the generic normative connection we have alluded to. In many
types of societies, further restriction would be opportune, if the boss is not be
a total dictator over its subordinates. A total power of commanding may be,
however, the right empowerment for a human user over its agents.
4.2.5. Empowerment to Renounce to Power
It may seem reasonable to give agents also the power to renounce to their
powers. In general terms this would be expressed by the following general
empowerment:
∀ j (DeclPow{ j}(¬DeclPow{ j}A)) (24)
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4.2.6. Empowerment to Empower
We give our agents a further chance to develop their societal relationships
if we give them the power of conferring a power. For example, the formula
below expresses the idea that j has the power of creating l’s power of creating
the obligation that k realizes A.
∀x (DeclPow{ j}(DeclPow{l}(OxE{k}A))) (25)
What kinds of empowerment to empower can be allocated to our agents,
according to a general rule? A very liberal choice would consist in stating
that each agent has the power of giving other agents the powers he has for
itself.
∀ j,k (DeclPow{ j}A⇒ DeclPow{ j}(DeclPow{k}A)) (26)
So, for example, since each agent j has the power of committing itself ac-
cording to (20), according to (26), j also has the power of submitting itself to
another agent k, giving k the power to commanding j. This will be done via
the following proclamation:
proc{ j}(DeclPow{k}OkE{ j}A) (27)
Note that according to the definition above, when j gives to k a power which
was previously possessed by j, j does not lose its power: both j and k can now
exercise it. Obviously, empowerment may lead to cycles. Agent j1 empowers
j2 to A, . . . , agent jn empowers j1 to A. However, this is no problem: the
latter empowerment simply is redundant, since j already possessed that power
(unless it has renounced its power when conferring that power to another
agent).
4.2.7. Recursive Empowerment
Finally, it is possible to confer our agents a further kind of power, which
includes both the power of conferring a power to create a normative position
and also the power of transferring to others a similar power. We define this
type a recursive declarative power (which is a special case of formula (53) in
(Gelati et al., 2002a)):
RecDeclPow{ j}(O jE{k}A) = DeclPow{ j}(O jE{k}A)∧
DeclPow{ j}(RecDeclPow{l}(O jE{k}A)
(28)
The above formula means that the holder j of the recursive declarative power
is enabled to exercise his power in two ways. The first capacity,
DeclPow{ j}(O jE{k}A) (29)
enables j to make so that k is obliged to realize A. The second capacity
DeclPow{ j}(RecDeclPow{l}(O jE{k}A)) (30)
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enables j to transfer to another agent l the same recursive declarative power
which j possesses. This latter notion is useful in those cases where an organi-
zation is developed in multiple levels, and the top level wants to delegate not
only the performance of the action, but also the command to perform it. The
exercise of this power may lead to cycles, but again, this is no problem (the
agent who started the cycle may consider having another try), or better it is a
problem that it is up to the concerned agents to solve, according to their view
of their own interest.
4.2.8. Specific Limitations to Empowerment
In the previous pages, we have sketched the constitution of a liberal, or better
a libertarian society, where every agent is considered to be fully able to look
after its interest, and where any normative relation can be created via the
consent of the interested parties. In many real life contexts, and in particular
in legal institutions, various limitations to individual freedom are provided,
for a number of reasons: preventing frauds, protecting the weaker party, pre-
venting the parties from making mistakes. Unfortunately, there is not much
that we may say in general in regard to such limitations. It depends on the
particular institutional what exceptions are made to the libertarian framework
we sketched above. Consider, for example, the regulations which require a
proclamation to a certain effects to be performed in certain specific ways (e.g.,
contracts concerning real estates have to be made in writing, or through deeds,
unilateral promises are binding only if they serve an interest of the promisor,
testaments have to be signed, etc.). We will not investigate here those special
conditions, nor the way in which our formalism need to be extended to cope
with them. This will be a matter of future research.
5. Representation and Mandate
On the basis of the notions previously introduced, we will now provide a for-
malization of the notions of representation and mandate (which we informally
introduces in Section 2).
5.1. REPRESENTATION
Representation is a notion which is very important in all modern legal sys-
tems, and it can be used for modelling an important aspect of the relation
between a user and her agent, or of the relations between agents: repre-
sentation enables an agent to act in the name of its user or in the name of
other agents. Obviously this notion is very important to achieve flexible and
decentralized decision-making. In the following, we always use the index j
to refer to the principal and k to refer to the j’s representative. First we may
70 J. Gelati, G. Governatori, A. Rotolo, G. Sartor
characterize representation itself as consisting in the possession of a declara-
tive power. The representative has the declarative power of proclaiming that
the represented person performs a certain proclamation: if he proclaims that
the represented person is performing a certain proclamation, then this counts
as this person’s doing this proclamation:
proc{k}(proc{ j}A)V E{k}(proc{ j}A) (31)
that is, when k proclaims that j proclaims that A, this counts as k making so
that j proclaims that A. Using the DeclPow abbreviation, this connection can
be expressed as:
DeclPow{k}(proc{ j}A) (32)
that is, k has the declarative power of making so that j proclaims that A. For
example, let us assume that k represents j with respect to permitting other
agents (towards j) to access j’s database db1. We represent this as
∀l (DeclPow{k}(proc{ j}(PjE{l}access(db1)))) (33)
which is to be read as k has the declarative power of making so that j gives
permission to any agent l to access. Then, when k says that j proclaims that l
is permitted to access the database db1, this counts as j’s proclaiming that l
is permitted.
Let us now consider what allocation of representative powers will be ap-
propriate to the type of libertarian society we have been so far defining. The
most appropriate choice seems to be to give any agent the power of conferring
to any other agent k the power of representing itself (everybody has the power
of making so that another person represents herself), in regard to any type of
act A. This is expressed by the following rule:
∀ j,k (DeclPow{ j}(DeclPow{k}(proc{ j}A))) (34)
Every j and every k are such that j has the power of conferring to k the
power of representing j, in regard to any proclamation. Representation does
not need to be conferred in relation to a specific proclamation. It may concern
any proclamation of concerning a certain type of proposition. For example, j
can confer k the power of representing j in all proclamations which concern
permitting access j’s database db1. This will be achieved via the following
proclamation:
proc{ j}(∀l (DeclPow{k}(proc{ j}(PjE{l}access(db1))))) (35)
We have so far considered representation as the situation where k’s proclama-
tion counts as j’s proclamation:
proc{k}(proc{ j}A)V proc{ j}A (36)
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which we have simplified into:
DeclPow{k}(proc{ j}A) (37)
Another type of representation is also possible: k’s proclaiming that A counts
as j making so that A:
proc{k}(E{ j}A)V E{k}(E{ j}A) (38)
This can be simplified in: DeclPow{k}(E{ j}A). The second type of repre-
sentation is necessary when the representative substitutes a principal which
would not be able to perform directly the activity which is delegated to the
representative. Consider for example, the situation where only certain agents
are empowered of making certain transactions (for example, trading on line).
Agent j, which has not the power of performing those transactions, can still
confer a power of representation to agent k, but this should not mean that
k’s proclamations count as j’s proclamation, since j’s proclamations would
be ineffective. It should rather mean that k’s proclamations count as j real-
ization of the proclaimed result. A further aspect normally involved in j’s
representation, but which we cannot approach here, is k’s duty of acting for
the interest of j, that is of adopting j’s interests or goals as his own goal in the
exercise of representation. In fact, being a representative includes having the
power of making certain declarations in the name of the principal, but also
the constraint to exercise such a power in the interest of the principal (on goal
adoption, see (Castelfranchi and Falcone, 1998)).
5.2. MANDATE
Wemay say that a mandate is a proclamation intended to create the obligation
of exercising a declarative power, or the obligation to exercise this power in a
specific way. The author of the proclamation is called the mandator, and the
bearer of the obligation is called the mandatee. So, a mandate has the form:
proc{ j}(O jE{k}A) (39)
where A consists in, or is related to, the exercise of a declarative power.
Usually, the conferral of a power of representation is accompanied by a
mandate, which obliges the representative to exercise the power of representa-
tion in certain ways. For example, besides giving his agent the general power
of representing him in buying musical recordings, a user may command the
agent to buy a specific recording, from a retailer included in a list of agreed
retailers, below a certain maximum price, and so on.
In such a case, the representation can be conferred through the following
proclamation:
proc{ j}(∀(l,r, p) DeclPow{k}proc{ j,l}(Pl(E{ j}DownloadRecord(r)∧
∧OlE{ j}PayPrice(p))))
(40)
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This formula says that j proclaimed that his representative k can (in the name
of j) acquire for j the permission to download records, and put j under the
obligation to pay to the vendor l the corresponding price.
The mandate to buy a record (the collection Revolver, but the Beatles)
would take the form of the following proclamation (using a very rough for-
mulation):
proc{ j}(O jE{k}DownloadRecord(Revolver)∧
O jE{k}PayLowPriceFor(Revolver))
(41)
Since the mandate puts the mandatee under an obligation, according to the
principles we sketched above, an effective mandate presupposes that either
the mandator has the power of commanding the mandatee (as expressed in
(40) and (41)), or that a contract between the mandatee and the mandator is
concluded. The first hypothesis may concern, in particular, the relationship
between a user and his personal digital assistant, the second hypothesis the
relation between a user and an agent the user has hired for a specific business.
The legal notion of mandate includes further refinements: in particular, k be-
ing the mandatee of mandator j in regard to an action usually also implies that
k should perform that action the interest of j. It seems that this may require
both the obligation to perform this activity (for instance buying a certain
house), and also the obligation to act in such a way that this power satisfies j’s
interests (buy the house at the lowest price, with the best conditions, from a
reliable seller, and so forth). It is not easy to specify what it means to make so
that j’s interest in A is satisfied. Note that, it is unwarranted to require that k’s
way of achieving A is really optimal, in regard to j’s interest. However, kmust
make his best, within the cost that are justified by the importance of the affair,
to achieve the optimum. One may wonder to what extent those refinements
should be included in a notion of mandate appropriate for interactions with
and between electronic agents. Whether such refinement are necessary, and
how they can be formalized this is something we will consider in our future
work.
6. The Framework Applied to the Contract Net Protocol
In this section, we show how the framework can formalize a well-known
trading scenario, the contract-net protocol. As informal specification of the
contract-net protocol we assume that proposed in (Pitt, Kamara and Artikis,
2001). For short, a contractor sends a call for proposal to a set of prospective
workers. In general, some workers answer to the proposal, by offering to
do the job, some do not. Among the answers received by the timeout, there
be refusals and offers. At this stage, the contractor chooses the best offer
according to some parameters. Then, it accepts the offer of the winner and
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rejects the others. The winner must perform the contracted task and inform
the contractor after the execution.
There are some constraints which govern the process of contracting. First,
a worker can only offer to accomplish a task which it is able to accomplish.
Second, a worker can only offer to accomplish a task which has been pro-
posed to him. Third, a contractor can only accept an offer when he has the
resources for paying for the price.
We may view these constraints in two ways. One perspective is to con-
sider them to introduce conditions for the validity (effectiveness) of contracts
stipulated between a contractor and a worker. This would mean that if the
contractor has no money, or the worker is unable, or the contract was not
preceded by a proposal, then the contract would be invalid. This would be an
exception to our definition of multi-lateral proclaims, namely that the joint
declaration of the interested parties is sufficient for the effectiveness of the
contract.
In this representation we adopt a different approach. Those constraints
express obligations on the parties, which they may violate at their risk (incur-
ring in possible sanction) but which do not imply the ineffectiveness of their
contracts. Note that this is what happens in the law: the fact that a party is
unable to execute a contract determines the liability of that party (for failure
to perform its contractual duties), rather than the invalidity of the contract.
First, observe that the content of the contract (which is proposed, offered
and accepted) is always OcE{w}performed(t)∧OwE{c}paid(p), which means
that the worker w undertakes, toward the contractor, the obligation to per-
form the task t, while the contractor c undertakes, towards the worker w, the
obligation of paying the price p.
We write cfpWc (X) to mean that contactor c calls for proposals (of making
a contract) having content X from any worker w ∈W . Note that a call for
proposals is a special case of ‘proposal’, as previously described, and cor-
responds to proposal{c},{w}(X) for any w ∈W . We write offer{w},{c}(X) to
mean that worker w offers contactor c to conclude a contract with content
X . Similarly, we write accept{c},{w}(X) to mean that contractor c accepts to
conclude a contract with worker w having content X .
Here is how we represent those constraints:
1. if a worker agent cannot perform a task, then it is not permitted to offer
to perform it7:
∀w,c, t ((worker(w)∧¬can{w}(performed(t)))⇒
¬P(offer{w},{c}(E{w}performed(t),E{c}paid(p))))
(42)
2. if a task has not been proposed, a worker agent is not permitted to offer
for it:
∀w,c (worker(w)∧¬cfpWc (X)⇒¬P(offer{w},{c}(X))) (43)
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3. if a contractor agent cannot pay the price for which a worker has offered
to perform the task than it is not permitted to accept the offer:
∀c,w, t, p (contractor(c)∧¬can{c}(paid(p))⇒
¬Pw(accept{c},{w}(E{w}performed(t),E{c}paid(p))))
(44)
We can now move to show a typical sequence of messages (in our frame-
work, proclamations) that compose the contract net protocol. First the con-
tractor issues a proposal of a contract the terms of which state that the worker
has the obligation to print a copy of the book War and Peace (t) and the
contractor has the obligation to pay Euro 20 (p) for it.
cfpWc (E{w}performed(t),E{c}paid(p)) (45)
As a consequence, now, workers, who are able to print the book are allowed
to make offers. This assumes that what is not forbidden is allowed. Let us
assume that worker w returns an offer, intended as a (possibly committing)
counter-proposal to (45):
offer{w},{c}(E{w}performed(t),E{c}paid(p
′)) (46)
where p′ =15 Euro. Let us now assume that this is the best offer c has
received, so that it accepts it (this implies c’s agreement; see Section 4.2).
accept{c},{w}(E{w}performed(t),E{c}paid(p′)) (47)
From (46) and (47) the following is obtained (within the institution):
D(proc{c,w}(OcE{w}performed(t)∧OwE{c}paid(p′))) (48)
This means that the parties have made a contract. The contract is effective
according to the general principles. In fact, according to the logical properties
of proclamation, (48) implies the following
D(proc{c,w}(OcE{w}performed(t))∧ proc{c,w}(OwE{c}paid(p′))) (49)
Finally, according to axioms (20) and (5) we obtain (within the institution)
that w is obliged to do the job and c is obliged to pay for it:
D(OcE{w}performed(t)∧OwE{c}paid(p′)) (50)
Once the contractor agent has decided which offer fits its needs the most, he
has also to communicate his refusals to the losers w′ 8:
∀w′ (proposal{w′},{c}(E{w′}performed(t),E{c}paid(p′′))∧
proc{c}(¬Ow′E{c}paid(p′′)))
(51)
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7. Future Developments: Applications and Computational Issues
As we have alluded to, this paper is mainly theoretical. In this section we will
briefly indicate two developments and applications of the framework we have
previously defined.
A first aspect regards a possible and concrete application of the frame-
work in the in the area of Digital Rights Management (DRM), a field that
has drawn attention from both the scientific community and industry in the
last few years. DRM is intended as a pool of technologies for data security
and protection, copyright protection and access control. DRM addresses the
management of digital resources, including their publishing, manipulation
and transferring. DRM is ultimately one key enabling technology for market-
ing intellectual products, such as music, images and e-books, on the Internet
(Kamyab et al., 2001). As a first approach, we have already looked at the
eXtensible rights Markup Language (XrML), an XML-based grammar for
specifying rights related to digital resources (XrML, 2001): XrML is in fact an
XML grammar intended for terming licenses related to digital resources. Li-
censes establish which rights are granted to which parties and the conditions
by which digital resources can be operated. Our first results are promising
(see (Gelati, Rotolo and Sartor, 2003; Gelati and Riveret, 2004)). We have al-
ready provided a simple extension of the set of elements of XrML language to
cover some types of normative positions required by our logical framework.
Subsequently, a prototype, based on this extension, has been built using the
JADE multi-agent system platform (Bellifemine et. al., 2003a; Bellifemine
et. al., 2003b) (see (Gelati and Riveret, 2004)). The result is a system that can
be used to make agents negotiate the exchange of goods. Although the system
seems to be a good test bed for some virtual marketplace scenarios, limita-
tions of the system are due to the nature of XrML: every concept contained
in a license must be understood by the counterparts in the negotiation and
this implies that every XrML tag must be explicitly dealt with the parser. The
future work will thus focus on devising a suitable inference engine, so that
agents can reason about rules reaching a more flexible behavior. This should
also permit to embed into the language and express more complex normative
concepts than those already added to standard XrML.
A second line of research consists in developing a computational frame-
work, based on the logical intuitions we have described here, and which
should be able to treat the basic mechanisms of institutional agency and nor-
mative co-ordination. Also in this regard we have some first, but interesting,
results. We have already proposed a computationally oriented model based
on Defeasible Logic. Defeasible logic has been developed by Nute (Nute,
1987) with a particular concern about computational efficiency and developed
over the years by (Maher and Governatori, 1999; Antoniou et. al., 2000).
The reason being ease of implementation (Maher et al., 2001), flexibility
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(Antoniou et. al., 2000) (it has a constructively defined and easy to use proof
theory which allows us to capture a number of different intuitions of non-
monotonicity) and it is efficient: it is possible to compute the complete set
of consequences of a given theory in linear time (Maher, 2001). At the mo-
ment, we have provided two extensions of standard Defeasible Logic. The
first incorporates the notions of “counts as” and agency, as described in this
paper (Governatori and Rotolo, 2003; Governatori, Rotolo and Sadiq, 2004).
The second combines agency, BDI concepts and obligations (Governatori
and Rotolo, 2004). Our future work will be devoted to developing a unique
framework which is able to deal with the cognitive component (BDI con-
cepts), agency, and normative notions (“counts as” and deontic operators). In
addition, thanks to the nice computational features of the logic, we plan to
investigate how the framework can lead to real implementations.
8. Related Work
This paper originates from two lines of research. The first concerns research
into legal positions, and particularly into the notion of power. The second
line of research concerns how normative positions are generated through
speech acts. In the first regard, we are particularly indebted to (Jones and
Sergot, 1996). The idea of power has been formalized also by (Allen and
Saxon, 1991) along similar lines. In regard to the link between speech acts
and normative positions, we refer to the works of (Jones, 1990), (Castel-
franchi et. al., 1999), (Singh, 1999), and (Colombetti, 2000), and for informal
characterization of delegation to (Castelfranchi and Falcone, 1998). The pe-
culiarity of our work, however, lies in the attempt of substituting a unique
speech act (proclaiming) to model all speech acts which are characterised by
a world to word direction of fit, that is all speech acts which are intended
to modify the normative (institutional) world. In most approaches, what we
modelled as proclamations is represented through different types of speech
acts (commissives, permissives, agreements, etc.), each one characterised by
its own specific semantics. On the contrary, we are able to view all those
performatives as instances of just one speech act, since their differences, from
our perspective, only pertain to the content which is proclaimed. This pro-
vides a simpler and more flexible framework for institutional performatives.
The framework is simpler since the logic of all institutional performatives is
exhausted by the simple logic of the proc operator. The framework is more
flexible since proclamations can have whatever content, and by distinguishing
their possible contents, we can provide a precise account of many nuances
characterising institutional performatives. Of course, a plethora of works have
been put forward to give a formal account of speech acts theory in MAS.
Let us mention two of the most popular approaches to agent communication,
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that is FIPA ACL (FIPA, 2001) and KQLM (Finin, Labrou and Mayfield,
1997). Even if some intuitions about well-known paths like propose/accept-
proposal have been provided here, a full comparison of our analysis to what
is developed in those settings is outside the scope of this paper. Such a work
will the object of future investigations.
One important issue, which we could not address here, is how to deal
with conflicting normative positions arising from the exercise of declarative
powers (such conflicts are even implicit in certain types of acts, such as when
an agent cancels an obligation or renounces a powers). Various approaches
are suitable, such as that of making use of defeasible reasoning techniques
(Prakken and Sartor, 1996)), or also of Event Calculus as recently done by
(Artikis, Pitt and Sergot, 2002). Also this crucial question will be a matter of
future research.
As regards to Section 7 we have presented the data model of the XrML
and the building blocks of our logical framework as discussed in (Gelati et
al., 2002a; Gelati et al., 2002b). We have then commented on the semantics
of the XrML with respect to the legal domain from a deontic viewpoint. We
have pointed out some current limitations of the core and standard extension
of the XrML, supporting our claim by means of the analysis previously done
in the logical framework. Our future work will comprise a well-defined legal
extension of the XrML in order to allow the formulation of all main concepts
as developed in the logical framework.
9. Conclusions
We are aware that this paper raises many issues, rather than providing defini-
tive solution. This is due to the complexity of the legal aspects we have tried to
analyse. We believe however, that the notions we have presented may provide
a very general model for normative interactions between autonomous agents.
In our future work we aim at providing a more refined characterization, and
at studying how the building blocks we have here sketched can be used in
building effective coordination.
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